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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent, 
-vs-
JACK L. CLARK, 
Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7371 
Appellant was convicted of the crime of involuntary 
manslaughter, by a verdict of the jury, on April 12, 1949. 
The complaint arose out of an automobile accident which 
occurred on December 16, 1948, approximately 11:30 p.m., 
at or near 2800 South State Street, in Salt Lake County. 
Prior to the accident the defendant had been operating a 
1940 Buick automobile in a northerly direction on State 
Street. With him were the deceased and two other young 
people riding in the front seat and five other people riding 
in the rear seat, making a total of nine people in the au ... 
tomobile. The highway was icy and slippery, but defendant 
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was operating his car at about the same speed as other 
cars ahead of him when his car began to slide to the left 
over across the center line and into the path of a south ... 
bound Packard automobile being operated by Jack R. 
Price. Before either of the two drivers were able to reduce 
the speed at which they were traveling the automobiles 
came together head on, injuring several of the passengers 
in defendant's automobile and resulting in the death of 
John Dale Cutler, a passenger in the front seat. 
The accident was investigated by the Highway Patrol 
and South Salt Lake police some time after it had occurred 
and Jack L. Clark was arrested and charged with the crime 
of involuntary manslaughter, of which crime he was later 
convicted. It is from that verdict and the judgment entered 
thereon that this appeal is taken. Because the principal 
point raised by this appeal is the question of the sufficiency 
of the evidence, a more detailed statement as to the testi ... 
mony of the various witnesses will be given later. 
At the conclusion of the State's case, defendant made 
a motion for dismissal upon the ground that the evidence 
was insufficient to "establish criminal negligence in the 
operation of the vehicle by the defendant at the time and 
place of the accident." (R. 124) This motion was denied 
by the court; and the defendant thereupon submitted evi ... 
dence which in many respects agreed with the testimony 
of the witnesses for the prosecution, but which evidence 
also more fully explained the reason for defendant's auto ... 
mobile sliding into the opposite lane of traffic. 
The court, in its instructions to the jury, submitted to 
them the question of whether the defendant was guilty of 
either of two alleged unlawful acts: ( 1) that the defendant 
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drove an automobile at a rate of speed greater than was 
reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having 
regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing; 
and ( 2) that he drove an automobile to the left side of the 
center of the roadway while overtaking and passing another 
vehicle proceeding in the same direction at a time when 
the left .. hand side of the highway was not free of oncoming 
traffic for such a sufficient distance ahead as to permit 
him to complete the pass and return to the right.-hand side 
of the highway in time to avoid a collision with an auto.-
mobile proceeding in the opposite direction. (R. 14, 15) 
Defendant, in addition to making a motion for dis.-
missal for insufficiency of the evidence, excepted to the 
court's instructions submitting to the jury either of the 
foregoing alleged unlawful acts upon the ground that the 
evidence was insufficient to establish either as an act of 
"reckless conduct, or conduct evincing a marked disregard 
for the safety of others." (R. 155, 156) Defendant also ex.-
cepted to the refusal of the court to give defendant's re.-
quested instruction to the effect that "skidding or sliding of 
an automobile on a slippery highway is not in and of itself 
evidence of operating an automobile with reckless or 
wanton disregard for the safety of others." (R. 156) And 
it is the allaged errors of the trial court in these particu.-
lars that form the basis for this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Appellant relies upon the following points for a re.-
versal of the verdict and judgment of conviction in the 
court below: 
1. The evidence was insufficient to show that de.-
fendant was guilty of "reckless conduct, or conduct evinc.-
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ing a marked disregard for the safety of others." Particu.-
larly, there was insufficient evidence from which the jury 
<;:auld conclude either 
(a) that the defendant drove his automobile at a 
speed greater than was reasonable and prudent, 
having regard for the actual and potential haz .. 
ards then existing; or 
{b) that the defendant drove his automobile to the 
left of the center of the highway in an attempt 
to overtake and pass another vehicle proceed.-
ing in the same direction. 
2. In giving its Instruction No. 7, the court improp.-
erly failed to instruct the jurors that they must all agree 
upon one or both of the alleged acts of wilful or wanton 
misconduct. 
3. The court improperly failed to give defendant's 
requested Instruction No. 2, to the effect that the mere 
fact "that an automobile skids or slides while proceeding 
along a wet or slippery street is no evidence that the party 
operating said automobile is operating the same at an ex.-
cessive ·rate of speed or in a careless or negligent manner." 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUS.-
T AIN THE VERDICT. 
Six witnesses were called on behalf of the State, to.-
wit: Jack R. Price {the driver of the other vehicle involved 
in the accident), Van E. Porter (a photographer who took 
some pictures at the scene of the accident some time after 
it occurred), Donald W. Rice (a passenger in defendant's 
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automobile), and three Highway Patrolmen who partici.-
pated in investigating the accident (Russell Cederlund, 
Charles G. Fogle, and Raymond De Vine). In order that 
a complete picture be obtained of the State's case, the testi.-
mony of these witnesses will be summarized. 
Jack R. Price testified that he was driving a 1947 
Packard sedan automobile belonging to Dr. Ellertson of 
Murray, Utah, in a southerly direction on State Street in 
the lane next to the center of the highway; that he had tra.-
veled in the same lane most of the way down State Street, 
except when passing other cars. (R. 46, 47) It was cold 
and the streets were continually icy-very icy. He had ob.-
served that condition earlier in the evening as he drove 
up State from Murray. (R. 47, 48) There were no cars 
immediately ahead of him as he traveled south,.and as he 
neard the point where the accident ccurred he was travel.-
ing about 35 miles an hour. (R. 48) On cross.-examination 
Mr. Price admited he had told the officers immediately 
after the accident that he was traveling between 30 and 
40 miles an hour; that he could have been going a little 
faster than 35 or a little slower. (R. 55) During the mo.-
ments before the accident and up to the time it occurred, 
he did not change the course of his automobile from one 
lane of traffic to another. (R. 49) He observed four or five 
automobiles approaching from the south in a normal fash.-
ion, when one of the automoibles came over to the west 
side of the highway "into my line of traffic, and I would 
estimate it would be two or three hundred feet down the 
highway." (R. 49) At that time, upon suggestion of the 
prosecuting atorney (and over objection· of defense coun ... 
sel) the witness further stated that he thought the other 
car was attempting to pass the other cars ahead. (R. 49, 
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that he could not tell from the movement of the other car 
what the driver was attempting to do; that he didn't know 
how the other car got into the lane in which the witness 
was traveling. Thereupon the court determined that it had 
been wrong in overruling defendant's objection to the tes.-
timony in this respect and admonished the jury to disre ... 
gard what the witness said as to "what this witness thought 
the defendant was trying to do." (R. 57, 58) 
At the time the northbound automobile came into the 
lane occupied by the southbound car, the witness testi .. 
fied that he couldn't tell from that distance whether the 
other automobile was skidding or not. (R. 57) At that 
time the cars were between two hundred and three hun.-
dred feet apart. From then, until the cars were about 50 
feet apart, the witness did nothing to turn into another 
lane of traffic to avoid an accident, but continued in a 
straight course down the highway. (R. 59) Immediately 
prior to the time the car came over into the wrong lane, 
there was the normal procession of cars going northward 
and there were no other cars in the immediate vicinity 
going south. (R. 59, 60) When the other car came within 
50 feet of the witness he observed that it was then in the 
process of skidding. (R. 57) He further admitted that he 
had more than one and one .. half seconds (after allowance 
for reaction time) in which to change the course of his 
automobile had he desired to do so after he first saw the 
other car come into his lane of travel, but that he did 
nothing to avert the accident. (R. 62) 
Donald Rice, who was a passenger in defendant's au .. 
tomobile, testified that he had been with the deceased on 
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the day of the accident, and that the two of them had met 
the defendant up town. After they met they went out to 
the Municipal swimming pool and from there to the Stork 
Club on South State Street, approximately 34th South. 
(R. 70, 71) A.ltogether there were five boys in the crowd. 
At the Stork Club they met four girls and the group danced 
and sat around for approximately an hour and a half, 
during which time two pitchers of beer were consumed-
two glasses for each person. (R. 70 ... 72) About 11: 15 p.m. 
the group (nine in all) left the Club and got into the de ... 
fendant's automobile and started up State Street. The de ... 
fendant, Helen Johansen, John · Dale Cutler (the de ... 
ceased), and Ruby Aldrich sat in front while the witness 
and four others occupied the rear seat. (R. 72, 73) They 
were going to the home of the witness, who lived just 
east of State Street on Whitlock Ave. (2500 South). (R. 
73) 
As defendant drove north along State Street, there 
was nothing unusual about his driving, nor did the car 
skid at any time until just before the accident. As the car 
started up from 33rd South (where they had stopped for 
a traffic light) the wheels spun briefly before getting trac ... 
tion, but otherwise everything was alright. "We was going 
down State Street normal and everybody talking, and felt 
the back end start sliding around" and right after that the 
accident occurred. (R. 74, 75) The witness estimated the 
speed of defendant's car to be approximately 30 to 35 
miles per hour although he did not look at the speed ... 
ometer. (R. 76) After the accident and before the police 
arrived defendant's automobile was moved from the posi ... 
tion it was in when it first came to rest. (R. 77) The wit ... 
ness further stated that the hood of defendant's automo ... 
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bile was lying right beside the car after the accident, but 
that it was picked up and moved off the street before the 
police came to investigate. (R. 78) 
On cross.-examination Donald Rice re.-affirmed that 
the automobile was traveling northward between thirty 
and thirty.-five miles per hour; that nothing unusual oc.-
curred until he felt the back end go around-toward the 
left-causing the automobile to go over onto the opposite 
side of the road; that prior to the skidding the car had 
been traveling in the lane next to the center of the road; 
(R. 79) that he knew of nothing that could have caused 
the automobile to skid unless the car struck an icy spot. 
The road was bare in places and icy in other places. (R. 
81, 82) 
Van E. Porter, a press photographer, testified that at 
approximately 12: 15 a.m. on the morning of December 17, 
1948, he took some photographs of two autombiles at or 
near 2800 South State Street. (R. 63) Exhibits A and B 
were taken showing the damaged condition of a Packard 
automobile; (R. 63) while Exhibits C and D showed the 
damaged condition of a Buick automobile. (R. 64) He 
also took a photograph of what appeared to be a motor 
from the Buick automobile as shown by Exhibit E. (R. 
65) On cross.-examination he admitted that his purpose 
in taking the pictures (Exhibits A to E, inclusive) was so 
that they might be published in connection with a news 
item on the accident and that his attention was directed 
particularly to the damaged portions of the cars, his object 
being to accentuate the damaged areas. (R. 66, 67) He 
also testified that he had no way of knowing how the two 
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vehicles or the motor happened to be in the position they 
were at the time he took the pictures. 
Russell Cederlund, a State Highway Patrolman, per ... 
sonally investigated the accident, arriving at the scene 
shortly after midnight, (R. 91) and made certain measure ... 
ments as to the location of the vehicles and objects on the 
road. From his observations he prepared a diagram which 
was introduced in evidence as Exhibit F. (R. 93) Near 
the bottom of the diagram, the officer marked an "X" to 
indicate the "possible point of impact" of the two auto ... 
mobiles. (R. 94) The evidentiary factors considered by 
him in arriving at this point were the debris, skid marks, 
gouge marks, and scratches on the highway. (R. 94) How ... 
ever, the officer did not explain that while these eviden ... 
tiary factors were scattered over a considerable area he 
was able to pinpoint the point of impact of the automo ... 
biles. Obviously the cars came together in such a manner 
that the entire front portions of both cars collided, along 
with parts of the sides of each. And whether the officer 
took the center of the area involved as being the point of 
impact, or whether his measurements were made from one 
side or the other of such area is not disclosed by the rec ... 
ord. His measurements indicated that the point "X" was 
16 feet west of the center of the highway and 12 feet east 
of the west edge of the hard surface. Twenty ... five feet 
northwesterly from the point "X" was located the Pack ... 
ard automobile, facing in an easterly direction, while 77 
feet northerly from the same point, the Buick automobile 
was found, upright, and facing in a northeasterly direction. 
The motor was located by the officer off the highway, 
south and east of the Buick, approximately 75 feet, while 
the hood was north and west off the highway, a distance 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
of 177 feet from the Buick automobile. (R. 94, 95) He 
further testified that the highway was icy in the portion 
which had been used by the traffic, but that on each side 
of the icy traveled way was an area of hard packed snow. 
( R. 98) 
The officer then identified Exhibit F as being a state .. 
ment taken by him and officers DeVine and Fogle from 
the defendant at the County Hospital approximately one 
and one .. half hours after the accident (R. 100) In this 
statement the defendant purportedly admitted he had had 
6 or 7 beers at the Stork Club, although the officer ad .. 
mited that at the preliminary hearing he had testified from 
his independent recollection that the defendant had said 
3 or 4 beers when giving the statement. (R. 104, 105) He 
also testified that both at the scene of the accident and 
later at the hospital the defendant appeared in all respects 
to be normal and in complete control of his faculties, ex .. 
cept for being upset and nervous. There was nothing ir .. 
regular about any of his activities or his talking or any .. 
thing else. (R. 113, 114) 
Exhibit F also contains a purported remark by the 
defendant to the effect that he was about to pass another 
car when it pulled into the lane in which defendant was 
driving thereby causing defendant to apply his brakes, 
which resulted in his car skidding. In explanation of this 
statement the officer testified that the defendant told him 
that as the defendant was proceeding in the lane next to 
the center o£ the highway, a car to his right (in the center 
lane for northbound traffic) pulled over in front of the 
defendant's automobile so that he was required to slow 
up and that in attempting to do so his car started to skid 
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and went out of control. (R. 106) State Street at the 
place where the accic~ent occurred is normally a six lane 
highway-three lanes for traffic in each direction. Appar ... 
ently on the evening of the accident, there w~re at least 
two lanes being used by traffic in each direction, although 
the officer was unable to state whether one or two lanes 
were being used by traffic that evening. (R. 108, 109) 
The officer admitted on cross...examination that he did 
not know how or when the vehicles and the motor and 
hood arrived at the point where he measured them to be 
in his investigation. (R. 106, 107) Although the Buick 
motor was apparently severed from its mountings, those 
mountings were made of rubber. (R. 114) 
Officer Charles Glen Fogle testified that he was with 
Officer De Vine and that they were the first officers to 
arrive at the scene of the accident. (R. 117) While he 
made no measurements (R. 119) he observed the general 
location of the cars and objects and believed that they were 
in the position shown by Officer Cederlund. (R. 117) He 
was further present when Officer Cederlund took the 
statement from the defendant and he witnessed it. (R. 
118, 119) 
Officer Raymond DeVine assisted Cederlund in tak ... 
ing the measurements (R. 121) and later was present when 
defendant's statement was taken, which statement he wit..-
nessed. (R. 122) 
The foregoing evidence is substantially everything tes ... 
tified to by the witnesses for the State in support of charge 
of involuntary manslaughter. In fact, the evidence adduced 
on behalf of the defendant (after the Court had denied 
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defendant's motion to dismiss) substantially corroborated 
the testimony of Donald Rice, one of the State's witnesses. 
But it did go further and disclose where the Buick motor 
was immediately after the accident and also further ex .. 
plained the reason for defendant's automobile going into 
a skid and sliding over onto the wrong side of the high .. 
way. Since there is no dispute as to such evidence it is 
also summarized, as follows: 
Victor W. Jones, a witness for the defendant, testi .. 
:fied that he arrived at the scene of the accident shortly 
after it occurred and prior to any police officer; that he 
helped to right the Buick automobile which was lying on 
its side; and that thereafter he observed the motor lying 
just east of the center line of the highway. In lifting up 
the Buick car it was moved to the west so that the car 
was then just west of the center and the motor was lying 
just east of the centerline of the highway. (R. 127, 128) 
Jack L. Clark, the defendant, in addition to corrobor ... 
ating the witness Rice as to the people who were riding in 
the car; (R. 137) their destination; (R. 137) the speed at 
which they were traveling; (R. 144) the condition of the 
road-to the effect that it was bare in spots and icy in 
spots; (R. 138) and the automobile was proceeding nor .. 
mally in the lane next to the center prior to the time it 
began to skid (R. 139), also explained the cause of the 
car skidding onto the wrong side of the road substantially 
as contained in the written statement taken by Officer 
Cederlund, but in more detail. He testified that as he 
stopped for the traffic light at 33rd South he was in the 
middle of the three lanes for northbound traffic; (R. 138) 
that as he started up, he waited until the cars to his left 
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\vent on ahead and then he moved over into the lane next 
to the center and proceeded in the line of traffic north ... 
ward; (R. 139). As they were traveling along-the car 
ahead being about 50 feet in front of the Buick car, de--
fendant testified that a car in the lane to his right (the 
middle lane for northbound traffic) proceeded to pull 
over into the lane in which defendant was traveling and 
immediately ahead of his car, thereby requiring him to 
attempt to slow up, in order to keep from striking the 
other car or at least coming too close to it. Immediately 
upon his applying the brakes he felt the back end go out 
and the car skidded to the left into the lane immediately 
west of the center line of the highway. (R. 140) He saw 
the other car coming and cramped his wheels to see if he 
could get out of its way, but was unable to do so and the 
cars collided. (R. 141). 
It therefore appears that there is nothing inconsistent 
between the testimony of the defendant and that of the 
State's witnesses, although defendant's evidence is some ... 
what more explanatory. There is some conflict in the evi ... 
dence as to whether the street was icy all over or whether 
there were some bare spots. Rice and the defendant testi ... 
fied that there were bare spots in the road, while Jack 
R. Price testified that the road was icy all over the 
traveled portion. Be that as it may, it is defendant's posi ... 
tion that the foregoing evidence is insufficient to establish 
wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct in the manner in which 
he operated his automobile. 
(A) The evidence is insufficient to prove that de .. 
/endant drove at an excessive rate of speed. 
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The direct and uncontroverted testimony of the state's 
witnesses is to the effect that defendant was operating his 
automobile at a speed of from 30.-40 miles per hour. Al ... 
though there is some conflict in the evidence as to how slip.-
pery the streets were (some witnesses testifying that the 
road was bare in spots while others testifying that it was 
icy all over), there is no dispute that the general road 
conditions were the same on the east side of the center of 
the highway as they were on the west side of the center. 
The evidence is further uncontroverted that the witness, 
Jack R. Price, was traveling southward immediately to the 
west of the center of the highway, at a speed of approxi.-
mately 35 miles per hour-it may have been a little more 
or a litle less. It is also undisputed that prior to defen .. 
dant's car going into a skid onto the wrong side of the 
road, it was traveling in a normal fashion in the line of 
cars proceeding northward along State Street. While the 
evidence does not disclose the posted speed limit along 
State Street, the court can take judicial notice of the fact 
that the prima .. facie speed limit for nighttime driving on 
the highways of the state is 50 miles per hour. Since de.-
fendant was traveling no faster than the other cars along 
the highway on the evening in question, and in view of 
the further fact that such speed was less than the prima.-
facie speed limit, there was no evidence to submit to the 
jury on the question of excessive speed. 
When defendant argued this point to the court on the 
motion for a new trial, it was contended on the part of the 
state that, notwithstanding the direct, positive and uncon.-
troverted testimony of the witnesses to the effect that de.-
fendant was driving in a normal and reasonable fashion 
with the other cars, nevertheless, the physical evidence was 
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such as to indicate that defendant was driving at an ex ... 
cessive rate of speed. The so .. called physical evidence relied 
on consisted of the officer's observation that the Packard 
automobile was found in a position 25 feet north of the 
"possible point of impact," while the Buick automobile 
continued to travel northerly for a distance of approxi ... 
mately 77 feet from such point of impact. Assuming the 
measurements to have accurately placed the automobiles 
after the point of impact-and before either had been 
moved-the mere fact that the automobiles upon colliding 
caused one of them to bounce back a short distance, par.-
ticularly where the collision occurred on icy streets, is cer.-
tainly no evidence upon which to sustain a conviction of 
reckless and wanton misconduct in operating an automo.-
bile at an excessive speed. 
In the first splace, such evidence itself along with 
other evidence of a similar character is circumstantial 
and inconclusive and where a conviction of a crime rests 
upon circumstantial evidence, it has long been determined 
that such circumstantial evidence must be established with 
certainty and must exclude every other reasonable hypo.-
t~esis, except the guilt of a defendant. In the case of People 
v. Bearden, 290 N. Y. 478, 49 N. E. (2d) 785, the de.-
fendant was convicted of driving an automobile in a "reck.-
less and culpably negligent manner," whereby two persons 
were killed. The evidence in support of the conviction was 
circumstantial and the prosecution argued that the infer.-
ences "fairly to be drawn" from the evidence were suffi .. 
dent to be submitted to the jury. In setting forth the prin.-
ciple of law applicable to circumstantial evidence, the court 
held: 
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"Where, as in the present case, the defendant's 
conviction rests solely upon circumstantial evi.-
dence, we examine the record in the light of the 
rule that the facts from which the inference of de.-
fendant's guilt is drawn must be established with 
certainty-they must be inconsistent with his in.-
nocence and must exclude to a moral certainty 
every other reasonable hypothesis." 
In the instant case the trial court failed in any way 
to instruct the jury as to the law applicable to circum.-
stantial evidence, so that should it now be argued that 
there was circumstantial evidence sufficient to justify the 
court in submitting the matter to the jury, the court did 
not do so upon that theory at all, but upon the theory that 
the direct evidence of the witnesses was sufficient from 
which the jury could conclude that defendant drove at an 
excessive rate of speed. 
Other physical factors . involved were the location of 
the Buick motor and the hood at the time the police in.-
vestigated the accident, the extreme damage done to both 
of the automobiles in question, and the fact that parts 
of the automobiles appeared to be scattered over a wide 
area. This evidence is explained by the State's own wit .. 
nesses, who testified that the hood had been moved off 
the highway before the police arrived, and that the investi .. 
gation did not take place until some time after the acci.-
dent, during which time the Buick automobile had been 
righted and moved and an opportunity given for parts to 
be scattered about the highway by passing motorists or 
onlookers. Neither was there an attempt on the part of the 
State to interpret the physical evidence by expert testi.-
mony, nor to reduce the factors to a matter of opinion. 
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As a matter of fact, the evidence was such that it could 
not be reduced in any way to a conclusion as to any speed 
on the part of either the southbound automobile or the 
automobile being operated by the defendant. The fact that 
the impact might have caused the southbound car to re .. 
bound 25 feet would not establish greater speed on the 
part of the defendant's automobile because at the time 
defendant's automobile, including the passengers therein, 
weighed considerably more than the southbound vehicle. 
The difference in weight itself would be sufficient to ex .. 
plain the position of the automobiles as found by the 
police officers. 
The courts have long recognized that to base a judg .. 
ment upon physical evidence is highly dangerous and 
speculative, and where, as in the present case, such physi .. 
cal evidence is used to argue excessive speed in direct con.-
flict to the testimony of eye witnesses, the courts have re.-
fused to permit a judgment to stand based upon such 
physical evidence. 
In the case of State v. Bast, 116 Mont. 329, 151 Pac. 
(2d) 1009, the defendant was charged with the crime of 
manslaughter arising out of an automobile upset. The phy.-
sical evidence indicated that the automobile had left the 
highway and proceeded along a shallow depression for a 
distance of 268 feet through some low brush, and into a 
hole, approximately 2 feet in depth, containing large rocks 
which caused the automobile to be deflected and to side ... 
swipe a tree. The contact with the tree damaged and flat.-
tened the right side of the car and embedded the bark on 
the inside of the right rear door. The highway patrolman 
who investigated the case testified that from his observa ... 
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tion of the physical facts, it was his opinion that the car 
must have been traveling from 55.-60 miles per hour at 
the time it left the highway. In reversing a judgment of 
conviction, the Supreme Court stated: 
"The state's only testimony to refute that of the 
three surviving occupants of the Herman car, to 
the effect that defendant was driving at the moder.-
ate rate of speed of between 30 and 35 miles an 
hour, was that of the boy Roedel and of the high.-
way patrolman Blake, who, over objection, testi.-
fied that from his observation of the road and the 
car after his arrival on the scene, he was led to 
believe that a car would have to be traveling close 
to fifty miles an hour to cover this ground and 
cause the damage it did to this car. 
"As before stated, Patrolman Blake did not witness 
the happening of the accident for at the time it 
occurred he was at his home in Kalispell some 10 
or more miles distant and he certainly did not 
qualify to testify with any degree of accuracy as to 
the miles per hour the car was traveling some forty 
or fifty minutes before he came into the picture. 
Such guesswork, speculation and conjecture can.-
not be said to rise to the dignity of evidence on 
which to sustain a conviction of the serious crime 
here charged. The burden rested upon the state 
throughout the case and this burden it failed to 
meet for we are committed to the doctrine that 'a 
defendant may not be convicted on conjectures, 
however shrewd, on suspicions, however strong, 
but only upon evidence which establishes guilt 
beyond reasonable doubt; that is, upon proof such 
as to logically compel the conviction that the 
charge is true.' State v. Riggs, 61 Mont. 25, 201 
P. 272, 280." 
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In Huber v. Rosing, 22 Wash. (2d) 110, 154 P. (2d) 
609, the action was commenced to recover for injuries re ... 
suiting from an automobile accident, the plaintiff alleging 
that the defendant was negligent in the operation of her au ... 
tomobile. The court made a finding of negligence in that ap ... 
pellant's car was operated at a speed in excess of 15 miles 
an hour (the maximum speed fixed for the zone in which 
the cars were traveling). While the record contained no 
direct evidence that the car was traveling in excess of 15 
miles per hour, the trial court found that excessive speed 
was indicated by the "nature of the damages suffered by 
the cars involved in the accident." As stated by the Su ... 
preme Court in its opinion: 
"No witness, expert or non ... expert, attempted toes ... 
timate the speed of appellant's car, basing his tes ... 
timony upon the damage suffered by the cars as 
the result of the collision. The trial court, from 
the evidence referred to only, reached the conclu ... 
sion which resulted in the finding of excessive 
speed." 
The court indicated that it had in previous cases con ... 
sidered the damages to the vehicles in connection with the 
determination of the question of speed. 
"In the case of Oyster v. Dye, 7 Wash. 2d 674, 
110 P. (2d) 863, 866, 133 A. L. R. 720, which 
was a case involving a collision between a passen ... 
ger automobile and a truck, this court considered 
the testimony of one who was extremely familiar 
with automobiles, who had been called as a wit ... 
ness by respondens and had been permitted totes ... 
tify, over the objection of appellants, as to his 
opinion concerning the speed of appellant's car 
prior to the impact, his testimony having been 
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based upon his examination of photographs of the 
two cars taken after tpe collision. This court held 
that the witness was not qualified to testify as an 
expert, and that the admsision of his testimony 
was reversible error, the testimony amounting 'to 
no more than an estimate or guess by a witness 
not qualified to testify as an expert.' In the course 
of the opinion we said: 'This court has held that 
in certain cases the force or violence of a collision 
between a motor vehicle and a person, another ve .. 
hicle, or any other object, may be considered in 
estimating speed. [Citing cases] This, of course, 
is proper in many instances, as the result of a col .. 
lision may indicate the speed of a colliding car, 
and evidence concerning the situation after a col.-
lision may always be considered by the trier of the 
facts, the facts being given such weight as is proper 
·under the circumstances.' 
"In the case at bar there was no direct evidence as 
to the speed of appellant's car, except the testi.-
mony of appellant's witnesses above referred to. 
The trial court disregarded this testimony and 
based its finding as to appellant's negligence solely 
upon the extent and nature of the damage suffered 
by the cars as the result of the collision. In other 
words, the extent of the damage was taken as in .. 
dicative of the force of the impact, and the force 
of the impact was considered a sufficient basis for 
a finding that appellant's car had been moving at 
excessive speed." (Italics added.) 
So, in the instant case, the trial court apparently al.-
lowed the jury to disregard the positive and direct testi.-
mony of both the State's witnesses and defendant, to specu.-
late as to the speed of the vehicles based upon the physical 
damage and their relative positions at the time the officers 
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arrived to investigate. No one will dispute the fact that the 
cars came together with a terrific impact. Their combined 
speeds, according to the testimony of the witnesses, would 
be approximately 65 to 75 miles per hour. But such com.-
bined speed would not indicate excessive speed on the part 
of either of the vehicles prior to that time. 
In the Huber Case, supra, the court went on to state: 
"In the case of Proper v. Brenner, 191 Wash. 540, 
71 P. 2d 389, 392, we said: 'It is often dangerous 
to arrive at conclusions from mere physical fact:;. 
It is, for example, rarely, if ever, safe to attempt 
to judge the rate of speed from a consideration of 
the amount of physical damage done; but. there 
are situations where physical facts are controlling.' 
"In 10 Blash:field, Cyc. of Automobile Law & Prac.-
tice, Perm. Ed., p. 349, Sec. 6560, the Proper case 
was cited with approval, the author, concerning 
that case, saying: 'To arrive at conclusions from 
physical facts alone, however, is often dangerous. 
It has been said to be rarely, if ever, safe to at.-
tempt to judge the rate of speed merely from a 
consideration of the amount of physical damage 
done.' 
"The above text states a sound rule and is certainly 
applicable to the facts in the case at bar." 
And finally concluded: 
"The court's finding above quoted clearly indicates 
that the finding of excessive speed was based solely 
upon the nature and extent of the damages to the 
two cars which collided. Examination of the state.-
ment of facts discloses no evidence concerning the 
speed of appellant's car other than that above re.-
ferred to. While the condition of automobiles af .. 
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ter a collision may properly be considered in esti .. 
mating the speed of one or more of the cars in.-
volved in an accident, we are convinced that the 
evidence concerning the condition of the two cars 
in question does not support the court's finding 
that appellant's car was moving at a speed greater 
than 15 miles per hour. . 
"The finding is contrary to all the direct evidence 
as to the speed of appellant's car. Evidence such 
as that upon which the trial court based its find .. 
ing is, at best, in its nature speculative and un .. 
certain, and unless unusually convincing (which 
the evidence in the case at bar is not) should not 
be held to outweigh uncontradicted testimony of 
witnesses who spoke from actual knowledge. The 
witnesses who testified to the speed of appellant's 
car were nowise discredited, and two of them, Mr. 
and Mrs. Chabot, appear to have been entirely 
disinterested." 
thereby determining that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish negligence, while in the instant case we are con.-
cerned with the question of reckless and wanton conduct. 
In Reel v. Spencer, 187 Va. 530, 47 S. E. (2d) 359, 
a guest brought an action against the driver of the automo.-
bile on the theory that the latter was guilty of "gross negli.-
gence." At the time of the accident it was raining and the 
streets were slippery. The undisputed testimony was that 
the automobile was being operated at a speed of 15 to 20 
miles an hour. The impact pushed the other vehicle side.-
ways about 5 feet and caused considerable damage. In de.-
termining that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient 
to show excessive speed in view of the direct and positive 
testimony, the court stated: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
"lv1o:·eover, it is said that the Reel car must have 
been traveling at an excessive speed because ac ... 
cording to Johnson's testimony the Reel car tra ... 
versed a distance of some 126 feet while the John ... 
son car was making its turn, and the force of the 
impact was so severe as to push the Johnson car 
sideways about five feet, inflicting considerable 
damage to it .... 
"Miss Spencer, the plaintiff below, testified that as 
the Reel car approached the intersection it was 
'not going fast,' but was being driven 'in a normal 
manner.' Indeed, all of the direct testimony on the 
subject was to the effect that the Reel car was pro ... 
ceeding at the moderate speed of from fifteen to 
twenty miles per hour. Not even Johnson testified 
to the contrary. The fact that the Johnson car 
was pushed a short distance along the slippery 
street and considerably damaged by the impact did 
not necessarily show excessive speed. The same 
result might have followed had the Reel car been 
proceeding at a moderate speed." 
Again in the case of Commonwealth v. Ushka, 130 
Pa. Sup. 600, 198 Ad. 465, where the defendant was pro ... 
secuted for the crime of involuntary manslaughter, the 
court held: 
"The only evidence from which it might be inferred 
that he was otherwise proceeding in a rash or reck ... 
less manner at the time of the accident was the 
relative position and condition of the motor ve ... 
hides after the collision. The position of cars after 
an accident may warrant some inferences. See 
Com. v. Fowner, 97 Pa. Super. 566; Com. v. Mat--
teo, supra [ 197 Ad. 787]. But the physical facts 
in those cases were much different from the phy--
sical facts in the instant case. After appellant's 
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Ford car was struck on the leftftont door by the 
llf2--ton truck, it went over to the right, hit a tele--
phone pole at the curb, and continued south on 
Limekiln pike about 78 feet. Fron.l the place of the 
collision it traversed about 130 feet. It :did not up--
set, but stopped in frorit of ,the tailor shop on 
Limekiln pike. The truck swung to the left, turned 
completely around, and fell over on its fight side, 
:which was 'damaged, at the southwest corner of 
the intersection.' There were ·skid marks showing 
the arc ,made ,by the truck. From th~ point of col--
lision to the overturned truck the. distance in a 
straight line was 52 feet. 
"Such icircum_stances alone do not w~rrant the in--
fer~n~e .that appellant··was driving .. his ~ar at an 
excessive rate. of speed or in, a rash ~r reckless 
manner."; · 
Again in the :syllabu~ to K?ies.v. ·J~raftsow, 40 Atl. 
(2d) 122, the following statement, is contained: 
"Where . automobile collision at intersection could 
have .occurred in ·the manner related by plaintiff; 
. defendant could not .invoke .to establish contribu--
tory negligence of plai'lltiff the rule ~f incontr9ver.-
tible physical facts as to speed of defendant's auto--
mobile or distance from intersection when plaintiff 
entered intersection based on plaintiff's estimates 
of speed and distance and the .distance traveled by 
plaintiff's automobile before ·collision, since such 
physical facts cannot be established by oral testi--
mony of relative. speeds and positions of moving 
objeCts.'' 
In Whitingv. Andrus, 173 Or. 133, 144 P. (2d) 501, 
the ; court; although ·recognizing that under some circum--
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st~ces speed may be inferred from. the circumstances of 
the case, held: 
"The collision caused the defendant's car to bounce 
backward 'eight or ~en or. twelve feet', and the de.-
fendant . contends that the Jury mig~t have de .. 
duq!d from that fact that the Merrill. car was 
being d,riven at an excessive rate ofspee<;J. Where 
excessive speed may reasonably be inferred from 
the facts and circq.mstances, direct evidence there.-
. ()f Is not required .. ·. Gieens}jtt y. Three 8ros. Bak.-
ing C9., Or., J33 P. (2d) 597. ML M~rrill's car 
wa.s · ,~. Swdebaker. sedan,.· while ·the defendant's 
was a Ford coupe,:· and. we' do not. believe that the 
mere fact that the, lighter car _pounced backward 
would justify . a jury ·in finding that ·the heavier 
car was being driven at an excessive rate .of speed. 
Norie of ·the persoJ)s. who. saw the. Merrill car ap.-
. proaching the scene of the~ accident. testified to any 
· facts whi~h ·would indicate excessive speed, or that 
there was anything· about Merrill's ··driving which 
. would indicate recklessness or negligence~" 
In Celner v. Prather, 301 Ill. App. 224, 22 N. E. 
(2d) 397 ~ :t4e, actio~ was by a guest _agq.inst. the ~riyer of 
an automobile for injuries puffere~l when the car $tru,ck 
a concrete. culvert,. the the9ry being that Jhe driver: was 
guilty~{ wilful and wanton. m;,sco{\dU~t. The court, in.re.-
versing a judgment for the plaintiff and 'rem~ding l the 
case for a new trial, stated~ 
""t4e only thing.· the evidence di~d~ses . is 't~at .it 
' struck ;the concrete 'abutrnent with great ·force and 
violence.· Whether this was the result of the de.-
ceased's wilful ·and wanton misconduct,. or whe.-
ther it might have resulted. from mechanical causes 
connected , with the· .car, or was the result of de.-
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ceased's negligence, cannot be determined from 
the evidence. Appellee urges that the force of the 
impact of the automobile with the concrete cul--
vert, and on the opposite side of the highway from 
which the car was traveling, is sufficient evidence 
to establish wilful and wanton misconduct on the 
part of the deceased. Proof of a mere possibility 
is not sufficient. A theory can not be said to be 
established by circumstantial evidence, unless the 
facts are of such a nature and so related, as to 
make it the only conclusion that could reasonably 
be drawn. It can not be said one fact can be in--
ferred, when the existence of another inconsistent 
fact can be drawn with equal certainty. From the 
evidence in this case there is no way to determine 
if the accident was the result of wilful and wanton 
misconduct on the part of the deceased, or from 
some unexpected mechanical cause over which he 
had no control, or such an accident as might have 
been the result of ordinary negligence. 
See, also, Piscopo v. Fruciano, 307 Mich. 433, 12 N. 
w. (2d) 329. 
(B) The evidence is insufficient to prove that de--
fendant drove his automobile to the left of the center o/ 
the highway in an attempt to overtake and pass another 
vehicle proceeding in the same direction. 
Upon what theory the court submitted to the jury the 
question of whether defndant was in the act of overtaking 
and passing another vehicle at the time of the accident 
cannot be determined from an examinaiton of the record. 
The only evidence on this point was that of the witness 
Price, who testified that he "thought" that defendant was 
attempting to pass the vehicles ahead of him when he 
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saw def~ndant's automobile come over on to the wrong 
side of the highway. Thereafter, the court admonished the 
jury to disregard any eYidence relating to what the wit--
r..ess thought defendant was doing. The witness, Donald 
Rice, who was a passenger in defendant's car, testified on 
direct examination by the district attorney that defendant's 
automobile was proceeding in a normal manner north 
along State Street when the rear end began skidding to 
the left and caused the automobile to slide across the cen--
ter of the highway. Again we maintain that the evidence 
was insufficient to submit this matter to the jury. 
Whether the court may have assumed that merely be--
cause the automobile did appear on the wrong side of the 
road, such fact was sufficient from which the jury could 
infer that it was attempting to pass other vehicles proceed--
ing in the same direction is not known to the writer of this 
brief. However, such an inference in the face of direct, 
positive and uncontradicted testimony as to the cause of 
defendant's automobile being on the wront side of the road 
would not justify the court in submitting the question to 
the jury. Again we emphasize that if it is to be argued that 
the verdict of the jury can be sustained upon the basis of 
circumstantial evidence the court should have instructed 
the jury as to the weight to be given to such circumstantial 
evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom. As 
stated in the case of Luther v. Jones, 220 Iowa 95, 261 
N. W. 817: 
"To warrant the jury in returning a verdict for the 
plaintiff, based upon circumstantial evidence alone, 
the circumstances relied upon by the plaintiff must 
be of such a nature and so related to each other 
that the only conclusion that can be fairly or reas.-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
onably drawn therefrom is the conclusion indi ... 
cated by the verdict. It is not sufficient that the 
circumstances be consistent merely with the plain ... 
tiff's theory, for that may be true and yet they may 
have no tendency to prove the theory. If other con ... 
elusions than that contended for may reasonably 
be drawn from the facts and circumstances in evi ... 
dence as to the cause of the injury, the evidence 
does not support the conclusion sought to be 
drawn from it. Neal v. Railway Co., 129 Iowa, 
page 5, 105 N. W. 197, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 905. 
See, also, Kearney v. Town of DeWitt, 199 Iowa 
530, 202 N. W. 253; Peterson v. Dolan, 186 Iowa 
848, 855, 172 N. W. 950; Wiederin v. Chicago & 
N. W. R. Co., 212 Iowa 1103, 237 N. W. 344." 
From the foregoing it appears that the trial court 
erred in submitting to the jury the question of whether 
defendant was operating his automobile at an excessive 
rate of speed in view of the actual and potential hazards 
then existing, since there is no evidence that defendant 
operated his automobile at a speed in excess of 30--40 miles 
per hour and there is nothing in the record to indicate 
that such a speed was, in view of all the circumstances and 
conditions, excessive. Neither should the court have al ... 
lowed the jury to consider whether the defendant was 
operating his automobile on the wrong side of the road 
in an attempt to overtake and pass other vehicles proceed.-
ing ahead of him. But the court at all events should have 
granted defendant's motion for a dismissal on the ground 
that the evidence was insufficient to submit to the jury. 
2. THE COURT FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE 
JURORS THAT THEY MUST ALL AGREE UPON 
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ONE OR BOTH OF THE ALLEGED ACTS OF WIL· 
FUL OR WANTON MISCONDUCT. 
Inasmuch as it was defendant's theory of the case that 
there was insufficient evidence to go to the jury, particu.-
larly on the matter of whether defendant was attempting 
to pass other vehicles, no request was made for an instruc.-
tion to the effect that before the jurors could find the de.-
fendant guilty, they must unanimously determine that he 
was guilty of wilful or wanton misconduct as to one or 
both of the alleged grounds set forth in the court's instruc.-
tions. The court did not in its Instruction No. 7, or in any 
other instruction, advise the jurors that they were required 
to agree upon one or both of such alleged acts of miscon.-
duct, so that it left it to the jury to speculate whether de.-
fendant may have been guilty of driving at an excessive 
speed, or operating his automobile upon the wrong side 
of the road in an attempt to pass other vehicles. In one of 
the earliest manslaughter cases arising out of an automo.-
bile accident in this State, this court made a determina.-
tion that the trial court should instruct the jury so as to 
advise them clearly that they must all concur upon the 
same alleged act of wilful misconduct in order to return 
a verdict of guilty. In the case of State v. Johnson, 76 Utah 
84, 287 Pac. 909, the court considers at length the prob.-
lem, as follows: 
"The question presented is as to whether error was 
committed in submitting to the jury a material issue 
upon which it is claimed there was insufficient evi.-
dence to support it, and, if so, whether the error 
was prejudicial. If in a civil case where several acts 
of negligence are charged, each constituting action ... 
able negligence, and the evidence is insufficient as 
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to one of such acts, but against objections neverthe.-
less is submitted to the jury and a general verdict 
rendered in favor of the plantiff, hardly any one 
would contend that no prejudice resulted on the 
ground that the evidence was sufficient to sustain 
the verdict on the other alleged acts. In principle, 
the mater in hand is not different. The jury here 
rendered a general verdict of guilty 'as charged in 
the information.' It thereby found the defendant 
guilty of an unlawful act not supported or justi--
fied by the evidence. Because the unlawful act re--
lated to or concerned intoxicating liquors does not 
call for an abridgement of the general rule that to 
justify a submission of a material issue to a jury 
there must be sufficient evidence to support it, nor 
as to the prejudicial effect against whom it is sub.-
mitted and a general verdict rendered in favor of 
his adversary having the burden of proof. The gen ... 
eral verdict here is not severable. Letting all the is.-
sues as to all of the alleged unlawful acts to the jury 
gave them to understand that they could render a 
verdict of guilty on any one or all of them, which 
was required to be expressed only by a general ver ... 
diet. Some of the jurors may have been induced to 
join in the verdict on one or more of the alleged 
acts, some on other alleged acts, but on which or on 
all it is impossible to tell. That none of the jury was 
induced to join the verdict because of the submis ... 
sion of the issue as to intoxication is also impossible 
to tell." (Italics added.) 
This fundamental principle was later affirmed in the 
case of State v. Rasmussen, 92 Utah 357, 68 Pac. (2d) 
176, although the court there, by a divided opinion, con ... 
eluded that the instructions were sufficient to advise the 
jurors that they "must all agree on one or more specifica ... 
tions of what constituted the unlawful driving and that 
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the jurors cannot combine their conclusions on the differ ... 
ent specifications of unlawfulness so as to converge to the 
final conclusion of unlawful driving likely to cause death." 
See also State v. Bleazard, 103 Utah 13, 133 Pac. (2d) 
1000. 
The court having failed to instruct the jury properly 
in this respect, the verdict of the jury cannot be sustained. 
3. THE COURT FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE 
JURY THAT THE MERE FACT AN AUTOMOBILE 
SKIDS OR SLIDES WHILE PROCEEDING ALONG A 
WET OR SLIPPERY STREET IS NO EVIDENCE 
THAT THE PARTY OPERATING THE SAME IS 
DOING SO AT AN EXCESSIVE RATE OF SPEED. 
It has long been established as a principle of law 
that the skidding of a vehicle upon icy or slippery streets 
is not itself evidence of reckless misconduct or that the 
automobile was being operated at an excessive rate of 
speed. In the case of Adamian v. Messerlian, 292 Mass. 
275, 198 N. E. 166, the court stated the law applicable 
to the case after relating the facts and circumstances of 
the case, as follows: 
"There was evidence tending to show these facts: 
The accident happened about half past eleven 
o'clock on the night of December 31, 1929. The 
streets were particularly slippery and icy caused by 
rain or mist freezing on the ground. The defendant, 
having driven up the hill on Highland St_reet, in 
Worcester, and having reached the top, began des ... 
cending on the westerly side of the hill. The street 
was twenty ... six feet eight inches wide, and the dis ... 
tance from the top of the hill to the place of the 
accident was nine hundred and eighty feet; there 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
32 
were three interscting streets on each side in that 
distance. The automobile had no chains on the 
wheels. The street at this point was thickly settled. 
There was one other automobile going in the same 
direction which the defendant passed or tried to 
pass. Another automobile was coming on an inter--
secting street, but there is no evidence that it came 
upon Highland Street. There was evidence that the 
speed of the defendant's automobile was at the 
rate of forty ... five to fifty miles an hour ..... There 
was also evidence that the automobile did not begin 
to skid until it had gone a considerable distance 
down the hill, and that the defendant attempted 
to check his speed by the use of his brakes. There 
was no collision with any vehicle. 
"There was no error in ordering the entry of ver ... 
diets in favor of the defendant. The skidding of the 
automobile in the circumstances disclosed was of 
itself no evidence of negligence. Lonergan v. Ameri--
can Railway Express Co., 250 Mass. 30, 35, 144 N. 
E. 756." 
In the case of Zeigler v. Ryan, 65 S. D. 110, 271 N. 
W. 767, the court held: 
"We consider first the question of whether there is 
sufficient evidence in the record upon which to 
submit the question of Kennedy's negligence to the 
jury. From the facts it appears that the accident 
was due to the skidding of the automobile as it was 
regaining its correct position on the highway and 
attempting to make the turn at the bottom of the 
hill. The mere fact that an automobile skids on a 
slippery pavement does not in itself constitute evi--
dence of negligence on the driver's part or render 
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine applicable. Davis v. 
Brown, 92 Cal. App. 20, 267 P. 754; Linden v. 
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Miller, 172 Wis. 20, 177 N. W. 909, 12 A. L. R. 
665; Barret v. Caddo Transfer & Warehouse Com .. 
pany, 165 La. 1075, 116 So. 563, 58 A. L. R. 261; 
.. -\nnotation in 58 A. L. R. 264." 
See also Bradley v. Thomas M. Madden Co., 333 Ill. 
App. 153, 76 N. E. (2d) 797; Amerine v. O'Neal, 136 
Neb. 642, 287 N. W. 56; Wilson v. Congdon, 179 Wash. 
400, 37 Pac. (2d) 892; Wallis v. Nauman, 61 Wyo. 231, 
157 Pac. (2d) 285; State v. Biering, Ill Mont. 237, 107 
Pac. (2d) 876. Risen v. Consolidated Coach Corp., (Ky) 
118 S. W. (2d) 712; Gilbreath v. Blue & Gray Transpor ... 
tation Co., 269 Ky. 787, 108 S. W. (2d) 1002. 
In the Amerine Case, supra, the court after reciting 
the following facts, determined the evidence was insuffi ... 
dent to show gross negligence on the part of the defen ... 
dant: 
"Plaintiff had not driven his car to work because 
some sleet had fallen the night before. Defendant 
offered to give him a ride home. Part of the ice had 
been worn off by traffic during the day, but the 
pavement, as described by plaintiff, was still icy 
and slippery in spots. Defendant drove without 
chains, but, other than possibly to slide a little now 
and then, his car had not skidded up to the time 
of the accident. In fact, there is no complaint in the 
briefs about defendant's driving, until the moment 
preceding the collision. 
"As defendant was approaching Forty .... Eighth 
Street, about 20.-25 miles an hour, another car, tra.-
veling 40 miles an hour in the opposite direction, 
swung onto defendant's side of the pavement, in an 
effort to pass traffic. To avoid a head.-on collision, 
defendant turned his car quickly to the right, off 
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the pavement and onto the dirt shoulder. After 
traveling about 100 feet, he attempted to swing it 
back. The pavement was approximately 3 inches 
higher than the shoulder of the highway. The left 
rear wheel caught in some manner on the edge of 
the pavement, causing the car to swing sideways 
and to skid in front of an automobile approaching 
from the opposite direction. A collision resulted." 
In Wilson v. Congdon, supra, the court held: 
"There is no evidence that appellant's automobile 
was at any time operated on the wrong side of the 
highway. That vehicle skidded from its own right ... 
hand side of the highway to the extreme left ... hand 
side of the highway, where it was struck by respon ... 
dent's automobile. 
"The failure of the driver of a motor vehicle to 
keep to the right side of the highway is excused 
where, without fault on his part, the machine skids 
across the center line of the road, but, where skid ... 
ding results from negligence, the driver is liable. 
The law of the road requires that automobiles be 
operated on the right of the center of the highway. 
While skidding, in itself, is not ordinarily evidence 
of negligence, where an automobile skids across the 
center line of the road to the left side thereof and 
collides with another automobile, the burden is up ... 
on the driver upon the wrong side of the highway 
to justify the violation of the law of the road. 
Haines v. Pinney, 171 Wash. 568, 18 P. (2d) 496; 
Dohm v. Cardozo, 165 Minn. 193, 206 N. W. 377." 
In State v. Biering, supra, the defendant was charged 
with the crime of reckless driving in that he operated his 
automobile on to the wrong side of the road. In reversing 
a conviction, the court held: 
I i 
I ~ I 
I I
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"There is no substantial conflict in the evidence 
on the material facts bearing upon this question. 
The defendant at the time of the collision was some .. 
what to the left of the center of the road. He testi .. 
fied that when he saw the driver of the one car at .. 
tempt to pass the other he slammed on his brakes 
in an effort to avoid a collision and his car swerved 
to the left. The driver of the passing car stated that 
when he got even with the car that he was passing, 
the defendant's car was somewhat over to the left 
of the center and was trying to cut off to the right. 
The occurrence was a matter to be timed by 'split' 
seconds. Four of the five eye witnesses testified that 
the defendant was proceeding lawfully on his right 
side of the road before the driver of the one car 
attempted to pass the other. But for the purpose 
of this case, we may assume that the defendant was 
technically violating the statute prohibiting driving 
on the wrong side of the road. One essential thing 
to be proved under this complaint is that the act 
of the defendant in driving on the wrong side 
caused the accident." 
The failure of the court to give defendant's requested 
instruction resulted in the jury having the opportunity to 
conclude that the skidding of an automobile was of such 
serious consequences that it alone would warrant a find .. 
ing of excessive speed and also reckless or wanton miscon .. 
duct on the part of the operator of the car. The jury was 
not properly advised as to the legal effect of such skidding 
or sliding, so that prejudice resulted to the defendant's 
rights, requiring the verdict to be set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
By way of summary of the arguments contained in 
this brief, appellant respectfully submits: 
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1. The evidence is wholly insufficient to sustain the 
conviction based upon wilful and wanton misconduct on 
the part of the defendant. 
2. There is no evidence justifying the court in sub--
mitting to the jury the question whether defendant drove 
and operated his automobile at an excessive rate of speed. 
3. Nor is there any evidence justifying the court in 
submitting to the jury the question of whether defendant 
operated his automobile upon the wrong side of the high--
way in an attempt to overtake and pass other vehicles pro--
ceeding in the same direction. 
At all events, if this court should determine that there 
is some circumstantial evidence from which the jury might 
conclude either that the defendant was operating at an 
excessive rate of speed, or that he was attempting to over--
take and pass other vehicles, then the trial court should 
have submitted the matter to the jury on that theory, and 
should have properly instructed them as to the weight and 
sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in criminal cases. 
4. The failure of the court to advise the jury that 
they should unanimously agree upon one or both of the 
alleged acts of misconduct was prejudicial to the rights of 
the defendant. 
5. The failure of the court to instruct the jury that 
the mere fact defendant's automobile skidded was not evi--
dence that it was being operated at an excessive rate of 
speed and was not of itself wilful or wanton misconduct 
was also prejudicial to the rights of the defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN 
Attorney /or Appellant. 
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